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Environm ental Studies

Cyborg Environm entalism and the Privileged Leftist (48 pp.)
Chair; Bill Chaloupka
1 ? '^ '
A cting Chair: Tom Roy

The contem porary environmental movement, while generally aligned with leftist
politics, relies on tropes that often reinforce a white, middle to upper class, heterosexual,
male hegemony. Although many types of people are complicit in this pattern, we can
focus critique by concentrating on one particular character: the white, middle to upper
class, heterosexual, male, left-leaning environmentalist. This character serves as a limit
case for privilege. W hat can be done to rewrite his tropic practices can be done for all
privileged left-environm entalists.
D onna Haraway, Noel Sturgeon, and Peter van W yck see potential in tropes based on
the cyborg, a partially organic, partially technological actor. The cyborg, they argue,
presents new political space for feminism, leftism, and environm entalism and acts as a
prophylactic to the réinscription of hegemony. Each author shies away from explicitly
discussing the white, middle to upper class, heterosexual, male, left-leaning
environm entalist, but I find that the cyborg trope is useful here, also. Overall, the cyborg
offers a vision of left-environm entalism that moves beyond images of guilt and innocence
and into a tricky landscape of accountability, danger, and commitment.
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Introduction
M y project is narrow and partial; To open new, anti-hegemonic, political space
w ithin environm entalism . M y strategy is to concentrate on the white, m iddle to upper
class, heterosexual, m ale environm entalist who desires to live counter to his violent social
heritage and to relinquish the durable and adaptive privilege that sustains that heritage.
W hat can be done for him can be done for environm entalism in general. The project is
tricky: Hegem onic privilege has a certain capacity to endure, even in the most liberal
sectors o f environm entalism , and opening new political space m ight only succeed in
extending the reaches o f privilege. I enlist, therefore, the help o f the cyborg (a very
tricky character).
Cyborgs are partially biological, partially technological actors. Some obvious
exam ples o f cyborgs include the optically-im proved LaForge in Star Trek: The Next
G eneration and the behooked Captain Hook o f Peter Pan. The particular cyborg I wish
to discuss is figured in the work o f theorist and historian o f science Donna Haraway.
This cyborg appeared when Haraway was asked to consider the future o f socialist
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fem inism under the Thatcher and Reagan adm inistrations, when m any fem inists were
using essentialism (som etim es in the form o f revived traditions o f goddess worship) as a
m eans o f em powering w om en.' Though never completely rejecting essentialism or
goddess worship, Haraway finds trouble in them and offers the cyborg as an alternative
socialist fem inist role model. Cyborgs are o f illegitim ate origin and uncertain kinship;
thus, H araw ay argues, they have a politics that does not rely on salvation or stable
identity. Cyborgs m ay be equipped, then, to open up possibilities within the very
technoculture that incorporates women, rather than looking beyond that incorporation for
a m ythical past or a natural(izing) self to return to.
Beyond the aphorism , “I ’d rather be a cyborg than a goddess,” however, H araway
uses the cyborg to disrupt the very dualism s that m ight make us take essentialism and
anti-essentialism so seriously in the first place. Haraway wants to treat dualism s like
identity/difference, m ind/body, culture/nature, technological/organic, truth/illusion,
m an/w om an, and even cyborg/goddess as both unresolvable and illusory. The divide
betw een the sides o f these dualism s cannot easily be erased, but it can be transgressed,
confused, or obscured. Our best bet, Haraway seems to think, is to treat dualism s
ironically, to recognize or blur them as necessary. “One is too few, but two are too
m any,” she says neatly. H araw ay’s cyborg has no com mitment to one side o f a dualism
or another; it straddles the boundaries and is both organic and technological, natural and
artifactual. It is one, both, and neither side o f a dualism — depending when you look at it
and w hat you w ant w hen you do.

' Essentialism asserts that a certain thing or class o f things has a non-accidental, inherent property. In the
case o f essentialist fem inism , w om en are posited as naturally m o re intuitive and naturally less exploitative
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The cyborg trope proliferates from there in H araw ay’s writings to offer a m ultitude of
possibilities for oppositional lives for oppressed groups living in a new, digital world
order. W hether the cyborg trope could be useful to white, middle to upper class,
heterosexual, male left-environmentalists, however, is left unanswered by Haraway. She
goes only as far as to tell us that her cyborg is definitely female and “hasn't really figured
out a politics that m akes the necessary articulations with the boys who are your allies.
I t’s undone w ork” (Int 20).^
Two other theorists, Noel Sturgeon and Peter van Wyck, continue the project by
exam ining possibilities for cyborg environmentalism. Sturgeon uses H araw ay’s cyborg
to refram e a perennial debate in feminist environmentalist circles over the dangers and
advantages o f essentialism. While Sturgeon’s work does suggest ways the cyborg trope
m ight help female left-environmentalists, it leaves out the question o f male participation.
V an W yck uses the cyborg in a left critique of deep ecology and proposes a cyborgian
way to care about nature without denying that nature is produced discursively and
w ithout relying on an authorizing narrative. Unfortunately, van Wyck, as we shall see,
replicates the very hegem ony Haraway resists by implicitly casting the white, m iddle to
upper class man in the role o f his cyborg environmentalist.
H araway, Sturgeon, and van Wyck each leave me wondering what it would m ean to
be a leftist, white, male, cyborg environmentalist. It is in the space left open (and thus
full o f possibility) by the overlapping partialities o f their theories that my ultimate

than men.
■ B ecause I quo te m ore than one work by Haraway, I will use the following abbreviation system for in-text
citations (full citations app ear at the end o f the paper): C M , “ A C y b o rg “ M anifesto” ; SK, “ Situated
K n o w le d g e s ” ; PM, “T h e Promise o f M on sters” ; M W , M odest W itness@ Second Milleniiim.com; Int,
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interest lies. There, somewhere in the sticky field o f anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-classist,
anti-im perialist, anti-heterocentrist, socialist environmentalism, I want to stage a meeting
betw een the cyborg and the white, middle to upper class, heterosexual male. W hat comes
o f it should say something about possibilities for our future.

M ethodology
The problem o f privilege occupies this paper both as subject matter and
m ethodological constraint. Simply put, there is a fear that my own privilege might
reinscribe itself in this work, even though my project tries to call into question such
tendencies. I find this interesting as well as crucial to discuss, so I will take a m om ent to
acknow ledge some o f the problems inherent in m y project and some o f the ways I find
these problem s productive.
In part, this paper will depend on a description o f ways m ainstream environmentalism
is oppressive to groups to which I do not belong, bell hooks warns us that such
scholarship, too often, is taken as more authoritative and legitimate than scholarly work
done on the same subject by members o f the oppressed groups in question.
E ven if perceived "authorities" writing about the group to which they do not belong a nd/or
ov er w hich they w ield pow er, are progressive, caring, and right-on in every way, as long as
their authority is constituted by either the absence o f the voices o f the individuals w hose
ex periences they seek to address, or the dismissal o f those voices as unimportant, the subjectobject d ichotom y is maintained and dom ination is reinforced. (1989:43)

W hile my research explicitly avoids dismissing or excluding the voices of the oppressed,
it does depend alm ost exclusively on the work (my own included) o f white, middle class
academics. To this extent, its pretenses at authority reinforce domination. The fear o f

“ C ybo rgs at Large: Interview with D onna H araw ay” ; and SI, Introduction to Simians. Cyborgs, and
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reinforcing dom ination in an otherwise “right-on” paper acts, however, not to paralyze
m e, but only to inspire caution. Rather than taking the easy out and writing about white
guys sim ply to offer advice to white guys, I write about white guys in order to refigure
the divides that separate their voices from other ones.
A related concern, again both topical and methodological, centers around gender
specifically. In my effort to be a progressive white male and to address the future o f
leftism in the mainstream environmental movement, I open up new paths for my own
gender-linked power. As Donna Haraway puts it, "The image o f the sensitive man calls
up, for me, the male person who, while enjoying the position o f unbelievable [male]
privilege, also has the privilege o f gentleness" (Int 19). Throughout her work, however,
H araw ay insists that we m ust embrace traps like this, for we have no choice but to cast
our lot somewhere. We are never innocent but always hopeful. More than once,
H araw ay describes her own work as a search through "discards from the W estern deck o f
cards, [a search] for the trickster figures that might turn a stacked deck into a potent set of
w ild cards for figuring possible worlds." Dutifully pointing out the cultural imperialism
o f appropriating the trickster figure from Native Am erican and other literatures, Haraway
situates herself in a network o f traps— "in the belly o f the monster"— trying to point us
from an “impossible but all too present reality to a possible but all too absent elsewhere"
(SI 4). As the m onster himself, 1 want here to search through the discards and openings
o f Cultural Studies and environmental theory in an attem pt to point in similar directions.
My project, as I said earlier, is narrow and partial. I ask only a few questions, yet find
m y self so tangled up in a num ber o f other questions that my conclusions can only be

W om en.
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incomplete. At best, I hope that this paper, composed, after all, in cooperation with
com puters and corporate-patented voice-recognition software, acts as a cyborg in its own
right— already compromised, miscegenated, “fucked,” and promiscuous— a portable
textual machine incorporating other people’s metaphors and technologies, my labor, and
m ultiple reading environments to generate connections o f unplanned obsolescence and
unpredictable productivity.^

Left-Environm entalism Runs Awry
The white, middle to upper class, heterosexual male is an often unm arked character,
w hether he is left-environm entalist or not. He is unmarked in the simple sense that many
people find it utterly unremarkable to be white or middle to upper class or male or
heterosexual. In telling a story, for example, we are unlikely to remark upon a person’s
race, class, gender, or sexuality if that person is white, middle to upper class, male, and
heterosexual. This character’s status as the default setting for hum ankind is integral—
cause and effect— to his hegemonic power and to his ability to erase difference and
reinscribe him self into the system, like a virus, without even writing his name. Like an
orthographic character, he disseminates, mutates, and reinscribes meaning and power.
The Greek word for character, ethos, tells us more about him; He is a set o f habituations
or cultural vectors that acts both as a normative paradigm and a system o f kinship— o f
inclusion and exclusion. Like a dramatic character he can be (but seldom is) described
w ith a list o f attributes, adjectives, and stories. This paper deliberately writes this

^ G ray, Mentor, and Figueroa-Sarriera offer the term om ni-cyborg: som ething that m akes “ o f everything
they interface with a cyborg, like the om ni-cyborgian theory o f articles such as this one” (1995: I4n6).
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character’s name with its descriptives. It exposes him to scrutiny by refusing to allow
him to define him self merely in terms o f what he is not, but instead in terms o f what he
preserves: the privileged positioning o f whiteness, wealth, heterosexuality, and maleness.
The white, middle to upper class, heterosexual male does not necessarily lack dreams
for a better world. W ith some exceptions, he is not holding meetings on the top floor o f a
M anhattan hi-rise, plotting how to reinscribe his power most effectively onto the body
public. The problem is trickier than this. Take, for example, the rebellious and idealistic
suburban adolescent male; He can find comfortable causes in atheism, spiritualism,
individualism , communalism, vagabondism, or environmentalism. I say comfortable
because, while these causes are not without import or value, there is a reason why they
are ubiquitous in suburbia and, for instance, concern for labor issues is not. (Labor issues
challenge too closely the class privilege that rebellious suburban youth enjoy.) M ost
counterculturalism within the Silent M ajority and its wealthier cousinry can be read as a
sort o f complicity to the tyrannical reign it presumes to question. None of the
“com fortable” causes listed above, for example, adequately challenges heterocentrism ,
patriarchy, classism, imperialism, racism, or sexism. It seems a little suspicious, a little
too convenient, then, when people well protected by the regime they were born into
characterize something like environmentalism (often wilderness preservation, in
particular) as the political problem o f first importance.
Although he m ay sometimes act like it, the white, middle to upper class, heterosexual
m ale is not an ontologically special category. The distinction between him and everyone
else is not a natural one, awaiting discovery by scientists or philosophers. 1 pay this man
so m uch attention only as a limit case for privilege— as a way to test left-
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environm entalism at its tenderest demographic point. The white woman, the light
skinned mestizo, and the well-to-do gay man, for instance, all have their own special
privileges and can make for dangerous left-environmentalists in their own right. N either
is the Third World lesbian o f color ontologically special. She could stand in as an
opposite limit case, an idealized privilege-less actor, but to treat her as a poster child or as
a standard o f reference simplifies extremely complex global circulations of power.
N obody enjoys total privilege, nor does anyone lack privilege altogether. To take the
w hite, middle to upper class, heterosexual male as seriously as I do here is merely my
political and practical attempt to call attention to an amorphous problem in leftenvironm entalism and leftism in general.
Left-environm entalism, as practiced by the white, middle to upper class, heterosexual
m ale can be dangerous. Its rhetoric and practices easily reinscribe domination through
tropes like voluntary simplicity and union with nature. The réinscription o f dom ination
depends on none o f these tropes in particular. Tropes are not dangerous in and o f
them selves, but dom ination needs them like music needs instruments. In the following
pages, I offer a brief bestiary o f left-environm entalist tropes that reveals a network o f
racism , sexism, classism, imperialism, and heterocentrism in white, middle to upper
class, heterosexual, m ale left-environmentalism. My argument does not situate itself
along the biocentrist-anthropocentrist axis, the monist-dualist axis, or even along the deep
ecology-social ecology axis. My problem map simply shows one character, the leftleaning, white, middle to upper class, heterosexual, m ale environmentalist, traveling
through environmentalism and spinning new tropic threads for his own web o f privilege.
I do not discuss environmentalist tropes that have been explicitly incorporated into right-
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wing agendas. Others writers have already noted that risk management, resource
scarcity, environmental accounting, and the population explosion are all tropes used to
reinscribe white patriarchy."* I focus, instead, on environmentalist tropes that still occur
prim arily on the left but that end up working to sabotage a left agenda.
Take, for example, voluntary sim plicity (not to be confused with the paranoid and
racist survivalist m ovem ent o f the extreme right). The “simple life” is meant to replace
the capitalist supply-demand treadmill with a cooperative society o f plenty, but it is
generally advocated and practiced by financially secure people and is facilitated by an
initial position o f excess. Going “back to the land” involves selecting certain privileges
and am enities to relinquish and others to retain, choosing what to live without but
retaining the power to get it back if desired. Simple living obscures privilege enough to
allow very privileged people to dress in blue collar chic, while they, at the same time, can
look down on the poor for buying packaged foods or driving big cars. Conveniently,
voluntary sim plicity also justifies apoliticality, because after paring down the num ber o f
social issues we are concerned with, we can concentrate entirely on what we consider
“basic” to life and not get hung up on issues like gunboat diplomacy or sexual harassm ent
in the workplace. These other problems, the simple liver may think, are only
sym ptom atic o f a misdirected, “com plex” life.
As another example, consider left-environm entalists’ glorified idea o f backpacking.
Sim ilar to hunting and fishing in the right-environmentalist discourse of “sportsmen,” this
trope constitutes an important part of m ost left-leaning environm entalists’ self-image— so

* For exam ple, Luke (1997), Seager (1993), G uha (1989), and Ross (1994), and essays in Bullard, ed.

(1993).
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m uch so, that left-environmentalists seem to spend more time feeling guilty about not
going backpacking than actually going backpacking. Being a backpacker is also the selfidentification most inspired by and inspirational to mainstream environmentalism. Like
voluntary simplicity, backpacking is most often a pastim e o f the white middle and upper
classes. A w indow shopping trip (and it is all about shopping) to outfit my partner for an
im aginary three-day, late fall backpacking trip runs up a tall bill. I quote as examples
prices o f nam e brand gear at a conspicuous, downtown shop because these name brands
and their advertising photography seem to define the outdoor experience o f a true
“backpacker.”
T h o rlo ® hiking socks
L ayers® T h e rm io n ™ long underw ear
F o x R ive r® Polypropylene liner socks
L ayers® Polartec'"''^ fleece pants
M a rm o t® fleece sw eater
M a rm o t® Polartec™ fleece pullover
Sierra Designs''"'^ rain suit
A solo® 52QTM hik in g boots
T u rtle F u r® hat
A r c ’T ery x® B ora 65’'^'^ internal frame pack
Sierra D esigns® W yatt Earp^w
Polarguard 30'^'^ zero degree sleeping bag
O u td o o r R esearch® G o re-T ex™ mittens
T im berline® w ater filter
L ic a m p ® Lexan'*'*^ Eating Utensils
Petzl® M icro™ head lamp
Q u a n tu m ® B uzz Away^M insect repellent
M S R ® Whisperlite International™ stove
M S R ® fuel bottle
M S R ® quart o f w hite gas
M S R ® T itan™ titanium cookset
N a lg e n e ® w ater bottles
C a m e lb a k ® A ero fo rm Reservoir"^
T h e rm -A -R e st® sleeping pad
H orny Toad A ctive W ear® Anacapa^w scarf
C h e m a A rm o r® Personal Defense Weapon^M
Bear/survivalist spray

$15.75x3
$46.95
$5.95x3
$38.95
$119.00

$89.00
$58.50 (on sale)
$108.00 (on sale)

$34.00
$320.00
$200.00
$62.00
$25.00

$0.95x3
$24.00
$6.00
$69.95
$8.95
$5.00
$89.00
$7.95x2
$24.95
$50.00 (on sale)

$30.00
$21.95

And so, w ithout a tent, or even food, the bill for a three-day walk in the woods comes to
$1515.05. While not many people go and buy all these items at once, the list above
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reflects what a self-respecting backpacking environmentalist “needs” and what my peers
in a mid-sized Environmental Studies department actually seem to have. The backpacker
is easily inspired to protect wildlands for recreating in, but because backpacking is so
expensive, people from other tax brackets rarely visit these same places. The wilderness
retreat, one might say, is no more than a getaway from politics, accountability, and the
horribly unaesthetic poor. The wilderness preserve, similarly, acts as a reservoir for
privilege, a gated community disguised as nature.
A nother tropic maneuver o f left-environmentalism is to speak o f our debt to “M other
Earth.” While, in some ways, this planet does act as a “womb” or generative matrix, our
im pulse to gender everything (witness gendered nouns in most European languages)
surely has becom e suspect by now. Joni Seager identifies a few of the main political
problems with M other Earth imagery. First,
It suggests a benign distribution o f pow er and responsibility, one that establishes an erroneous
and dangerous assum ption about the relations between us and the environm ent. It obfuscates
the pow er relations that are really involved when we try to sort out w h o ’s controlling what, and
w h o ’s responsible for what, in the environm ental crisis. It is not an effective political
organizing tool; I f the earth is really our mother, then we are children, and cann ot be held fully
accountable for our actions. (219)

Casting planet as m other helps us to ignore human pow er differentials because they
becom e small potatoes in the shadow o f the Earth’s matriarchal and benevolent rule. It
gives us room to take some o f our mess seriously while assuming that other parts o f it
will eventually get cleaned up like the urine stains we leave on the toilet. The sexism of
the M other Earth image is also disconcerting. “In a patriarchal culture in which female
status is cast as subservient status, there are inherent pitfalls in sex-typing an inherently
gender-free entity” (ibid.). These dangers are that the Earth will be treated like we treat
w om en— as resource, as lesser— and that, at the same time, we will limit w om en’s

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12

identities to “earthly” qualities like care, intuition, and reproduction (leaving power,
logic, and culture for men). Furthering gender dualisms when most, if not all, o f our
dualism s are used as hierarchies to justify oppression cannot make for a very consistently
leftist environmentalism.
A nother set o f left-leaning white environmentalist tropes deals with ethnic and
cultural diversity. M ost N ew Age, hippie, and world music consumer cultures have a
dual w orship o f nature and o f those humans they consider close to nature. In a perversely
im perialistic maneuver. Native Am ericans and Tibetans become the ultimate charism atic
m egafauna for German and U.S. greens, with Native Americans often being identified
w ith animal totems. Senegalese guitarists, South Asian sitarists, and Native Am erican
flautists garner much adoration but only end up fulfilling the dictum that for a person of
color to be famous in the U.S., s/he must be an entertainer. All this worship comes to a
crashing halt when M akah go whaling, Amazon peoples wear Nikes, or Inuits watch
television.^ We like our world multicultural, but only superficially, as a way o f
disguising our own whiteness. As bell hooks notes in “Eating the Other,” “W ithin
com m odity culture, ethnicity becomes spice, seasoning that can liven up the dull dish that
is m ainstream white culture” (21). White multiculturalism seeks to act out fantasies
about contact with the Other but tends to do so in a way that preserves the status quo.
W hen white m ulticulturalist environmentalists performatively fraternize with or idolize
individuals or cultures that they imagine fit on the “nature” side o f the nature/culture

^ W hite view ers looking for Native Am erican characters to idolize may also be disappointed in indigenous
films like D a n ce M e O u tsid e or S m o ke Signals. T hese w orks trouble the image o f the noble savage by
sh o w in g w ays reservation life can be less than ideal and by implying guilt on the part o f white society for
som e o f the problems o f contem porary N ative America.
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divide, they perpetuate a harmful dichotomy and disingenuously privilege the “natives”
on their side while secretly congratulating themselves on their own.
Related to this fetishization o f non-white ethnicity is the environmentalist call for us
to lose control, to merge with the natural world. In the case o f two movement rituals,
m arijuana use and m editative walks in the woods, attempts by the privileged
environm entalist to lose control often end up reinscribing privilege. A white, male
environm entalist, for example, might smoke m arijuana and lose control in a way that
rem ains totally in control. He decides when to dissolve and when to sober up, and the
basically private nature o f drug use means that he need not be confronted, while
chem ically compromised, by anything too far outside o f his realm o f comfort. Likewise,
during a m editative w alk in the woods, our character might work toward breaking down
his sense o f individual agency in favor o f a broader union with the ecosphere, but in the
woods, he takes the opportunity to leave other responsibilities behind and to simulate the
ultim ate state o f power; oneness with totality. Perversely, Seager notes, when practiced
by privileged female environmentalists, the same rituals can actually disempower, rather
than empower.
For centuries w om e n have been told that they have no singular identity. W om en have always
been subsum ed by culture and men, and denied independent existence. Selflessness,
u n b o u n d e d oneness, total connectedness, and denial o f independent identity have been central
to w o m e n ’s oppression. (235)

In this light, suggesting that women should dissolve themselves into the ecosphere
through drug use or m editation works reactionarily to reverse gains wom en have made in
establishing separate agency. And, o f course, both white men and white women become
suspect when they fetishize other cultures as paradigms for surrendering independent
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agency. White superiority is asserted when Native Americans, for example, are
considered role models in this way when, in reality, they have a strong tradition of
sophisticated political agency, and any control lost by them was probably stolen.
Seager also touches on the final left-environm entalist trope I will discuss:
professionalization within the environmental movement. The professionalization o f leftenvironm entalism began in the 1980s with the rapid membership growth o f many m ajor
environm ental non-profits* and continued into the 1990s with a bloom o f academic
departm ents devoted to environmental issues.^ W ithout essentializing men or women,
Seager points out that professionalization often means increased male control and
decreased valuation o f the “feminine.” The growth o f respectability in the environmental
m ovem ent came w ith a turn away from its diverse grassroots elements and toward a
reincarnation o f its original history as a m en’s club pastime. W omen in leading
environm entalist jobs must mirror the image o f the successful corporate woman o f the
1980s: clean-cut but sexy... a “ballbreaker.”
T he new ly professionalized environm ental m o vem en t is one in which “ pragm atics” and
“ credibility” are given privilege over “ em otionalism ,” w hich is equated with “amateurism.”
Increasing prim acy is given to slick com m unication skills, pragm atic politics and a
professional ap pearan ce— as measured by the most conventional yardsticks. T he “ reasonable
m a n ” is replacing the “ emotional w o m a n ” as a green archetype, a presumptive dualism that
dim inishes both m en and w om en. (187)

M ale/fem ale dualism s are unconsciously reinscribed as left-environmentalism infiltrates
the old-boys netw ork and vice versa. The incessant call among environmentalist ranks to
“Do the science!” plays into this valuation o f the “masculine,” as science is still
considered a male domain. Professionalism, in general, also works to hide political

See Dunlap and M ertig, eds. (1992).
^ For N e w York Tim es M a g a zin e's take on this, see Parini (1995).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15

interest under the m asks o f objectivity, logic, and compromise. While this may help
environm entalist agendas become policy, it can also help the race, class, and gender
interests o f environmentalists pass as pragmatism and not politics.
It may seem that, without knowing it, I am leaning toward an agenda similar to the
left-environm entalism o f Murray Bookchin. Indeed, Bookchin’s social ecology intends
to move beyond the réinscription o f hegemony in environmental movements such as deep
ecology. The hypothesis that our environmental crisis is a mere symptom o f our
diseased, exploitative social structure, however, is simplistic at best. And this kind o f
search for a “root cause” o f our problems usually divides, more than unites,
environmentalists.® Social ecology tends, in its suggestions for revolution, to
underestim ate or wish away the inertia of white, middle to upper class, heterosexual,
m ale privilege. To argue, as a leftist, that we should all just become socialist-anarchists
is irresponsible in that it offers no coherent strategy for dealing with the potential
persistence o f patriarchal privilege. If, as Bookchin seems to think, it were as easy as just
realizing that there is enough stuff to go around and that we ought to love one another,
then the Beatles would have fixed everything 30 years ago. Leftism is inescapably
utopian but must stay cognizant o f its historical conditions; not free to be no-place-at-all,
it m oves around in a very sticky mess.
Attention to the actual workings o f left-environmentalist tropes reveals an
exceedingly tricky (and sticky) conservation of privilege. The trick behind it all seems to
be environm entalism ’s ideological monopoly on the “natural.” Any ideology would like
to think o f itself as natural, as fairly straightforward and uncontingent, in order to distract
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from the messy, questionable, and negotiable aspects o f its political claims. With
environm entalist ideology, however, nature and the natural lie at the very center o f
attention. In a circular tw ist o f logic, environmentalism becomes the natural ideology
because it strives to protect the natural.^ As an expert on or voice for the natural,
environm entalism wins the power to deal in distinctions between natural and unnatural—
m em bers o f an im perfect dichotomy— and thus claims an awesome pow er to authorize or
discredit narratives. The contingent and political nature o f the act o f distinguishing
betw een natural and unnatural is hidden, and environmentalism becomes the single most
im portant political cause. At its tamest, this means that democracy and social politics are
overshadow ed by sincere efforts to save rivers and trees; at its worst, it means that
hegem onic practices can be dressed up in the robes o f environmental activism or
ecological imperative.'® The cyborg, an entity with a promiscuously ambiguous
relationship to nature, may be o f use here.

Prelude to the Cyborg
Cyborgs abound. From designer tomatoes to people with pacemakers, mergers o f
technology and organism no longer appear exclusively in comic books. We have (been)
assimilated. Donna Haraway finds both danger and promise in this transgression o f one
o f our m ost sacred boundaries: the nature/artifice divide. Although the cyborg predates

* See Ellis (1996).
T h a n k s to Bill C h aloup ka for thoughts on this.
T h e stock exam ple here is the connection betw een environmentalism an d genocide in Nazi Germany.
A pp eals to maintain the “natural” state o f N orthern Europe led to both conservation o f trees and
ex term ination o f “ im pure” races. See Ferry, (19xx).
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H araw ay,' ’ she is one o f its most important surrogate parents. Because we will
ultim ately be discussing the potential o f Haraway's figuration o f the cyborg to help with
the problem s o f privileged left-environmentalism, I here essay an idiosyncratic retelling
o f her theory. An author entirely excessive with tropes and comfortable with ambiguity,
Haraw ay perhaps prefers idiosyncratic interpretations. I will unabashedly recontextualize
her use o f the cyborg trope in ways that my political commitments and philosophical
training suggest— looking first at her politics and philosophy, next discussing her
thoughts on cyborgs, and closing with the question o f cyborg gender.
H araw ay's work is hard to categorize. M oving freely between disciplines like
w om en’s studies, anthropology, cultural studies, biology and biochemistry, history of
science, literary criticism, and science fiction, it frustrates some people to no end.'^
H araw ay’s work is flamboyant, but there is something productive about it. Throughout
her interventions into multiple disciplines, Haraway consistently incorporates a strong
socialist, feminist, anti-nuclear, anti-racist, and anti-heterocentrist agenda as well as
com plex theoretical arguments— making her somewhat o f a cult figure for the
“postm odern” left.'^ Since H araw ay’s philosophical commitments are integral to how
she envisions the cyborg and how the cyborg might be useful to my character, I will
spend a few pages unpacking them.

" S o m e w o u ld argue that cyborgs have always been around, but the word was probably first used by
scientist M anfred Clynes in 1960 to describe a m an-m achine coupling he believed would allow space
travel.
Recently, ! found m y s e lf on a plane sitting next to a Boston University anthropologist who, noticing I
w as rea d in g H a ra w a y ’s latest book, w ent to great lengths to argue that H a raw a y 's anthropological w o rk is
un fo und ed in science and should be discounted entirely. “ She just put som ething out in a journ al in my
field,” he said, “ and reading it, y o u ’re ju s t like "where the h ell is this co m ing fro m ? ” ’
” See, for example. W ired M a g a zin e 's portrayal o f her (Kunzru 1997),
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H araw ay’s w riting boils down to a discussion o f semiotics. In the mechanics o f
m eaning, Haraway believes, lies the key to understanding most o f what we can
understand (and change) about our world. M eaning is not a simple thing, though. The
w orld is not a book waiting to be read (by scientists), an object waiting to be named (by
A dam ), or a blank slate waiting to be filled (by postmodernists). M eaning m aking is not
an act that occurs separately from the world. M eaning and the world are, instead,
intricately tied up in a process Haraway calls articulation.
She uses this term (articulation) in a play on its etymological connections to concepts
o f expression, segmentedness, and connectedness. Expression, segmentation, and
connection occur on material as well as semiotic planes. For instance, genes and orators
both express themselves; vertebrae and sentences are both segmented; and ideas and
m olecules can both be connected. Articulation, Haraway argues, even occurs across the
divide between material and semiotic. Language plays a role in the articulation o f the
m aterial world, and the material world plays a part in the construction o f language.
H araw ay invokes a mushy material-semiotic cosmos, pulsing with articulation:
L a n guage is the effect o f articulation, and so are bo d ie s.... Nature m ay be speechless, w ithout
language, in the hum an sense; but nature is highly articulate. Discourse is only one process o f
articulation. A n articulated world has an undecidable num ber o f nodes and sites w here
connections can be made. T he surfaces o f this kind o f world are not frictionless curved planes.
Unlike things can be jo in e d — and like things broken apart— and vice versa. (PM 324)

In this kind o f world we continually interact with other actors (human and otherwise) to
reconnect the ways our world is strung together. Actors are material-semiotic entities,
sim ultaneously bodily and discursive, always collective in articulation. Together they
make up the com plex material-semiotic system we call “reality.’' M aterial-semiotic
actors, or nodes, could be words, people, laws, bears, winds, electrons, pulsars, or
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anything that acts like a unit in a material-semiotic world. Such nodes appear, sometimes
only ephemerally, as the result of articulation and they continue on to make new
articulations. “Their boundaries materialize in social interaction among humans and non
hum ans” (298). The boundaries between m aterial-sem iotic actors are real but only in a
w eak sense.
“ O bje c ts” like bodies do not pre-exist as such. Similarly, “ nature” cannot pre-exist as such, but
neither is its existence ideological. Nature is a c om m on place and a powerful discursive
c onstruction, effected in the interactions am o n g m aterial-sem iotic actors, hum an and n o t....
[It] is not a ghost, m erely a protean trickster, (ibid.)

The tricky realness o f nature and m aterial-semiotic actors suggests the need for a tricky
way o f understanding reality and truth and for an epistemology that avoids stripping the
w orld dow n to a passive resource for language.
As a m aterial-sem iotic mush, the world never stays still long enough to be figured
out, but it nevertheless makes claims on us. “This world must always be articulated, from
p eople’s points o f view, through ‘situated know ledges,” ’ through truth claims that make
no attem pt to transcend embodiedness (313). Situated knowledges are neither relativistic,
nor hegemonic. They embrace
sim u lta n eo u sly an account o f radical historical contingency for all know ledge claims and
k n o w in g subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our ow n ‘semiotic technologies’ for
m a k in g meanings, a n d a no-nonsense com m itm ent to faithful accounts o f a ‘re a l’ world, one
that can be partially shared and friendly to earth-w ide projects o f finite freedom, adequate
material abundance, m odest m eaning in suffering, and limited happiness. (SK 187)

Haraway proclaims that, from where she is standing, “Objectivity turns out to be about
particular and specific embodiment, and definitely not about the false vision promising
transcendence o f all limits and responsibility” (190). Objectivity is a form o f articulation,
alw ays partial and never complete.
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Situated knowledges are also always already political; they are “partial in the sense of
being /h r [and in\ some worlds and not others. There is no way around this polluting
criterion for strong objectivity” (MW 37). We are embodied, thus interested, thus
political. In m eaning-making, we end up throwing our articulative weight in certain
directions but not in others. Apoliticality is only a deceptive guise. That our articulations
and truth claims are political means that the effort to police the divide between spin and
truth may fail.
Stories and facts do not naturally keep a respectable distance; indeed, they promiscuously
co habit the sam e very material places. Determ ining w hat constitutes each dimension takes
boun dary-m aking and m aintenance work. (68)

This work is done by different people with different ends in mind. The articulation of
fact requires a non-innocent process o f sorting through stories and reworking boundaries.
H araw ay’s epistem ology highlights non-innocence and leaves to those committed to
faithful, political accounts o f embodied reality “the confusing task o f making partial, real
connection” with the world (CM 161). We can take facts seriously at the same tim e as
seeing them as stories. We can argue that some acts o f boundary maintenance need more
troubling and reworking than others. “Some differences are playful; some are poles o f
world historical system s o f domination. ‘Epistem ology’ is about knowing the difference”
(ibid.).
H araw ay’s call to distinguish between playful and dangerous difference suggests an
interesting take on m odernity’s penchant for dividing the world into twos. Haraway does
not take dualisms, like material/semiotic, at face value, but neither does she dismiss them
completely.
Certain dualism s have been persistent in W estern traditions; they have all been systemic to the
logics and practices o f domination o f w om en, people o f color, nature, workers, animals— in
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short, dom ination o f all constituted as others, whose task is to mirror the self. C h ie f am ong
these troubling dualism s are self/other, m ind/body, culture/nature, male/female,
civilized/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, m aker/m ade, active/passive,
right/wrong, truth/iilusion, total/partial, God/man. (CM 177)

T he dualism s Haraway lists are the currency o f modernity, o f its domination of the other,
and o f its alienation o f the self. Haraway argues that to be the self o f the left side o f these
dualism s is illusory and that it means surviving entirely through the other, who acts as an
invisible resource. The unmarked self (well-off, white, straight, etc.) is defined only by
not being what the invisible other is (poor, black, queer, etc.). In a sense, then, the self
has no ontology o f its own. The other, denied a selfhood of its own, is called upon to
labor on the selfhood o f the unmarked, and is thus left “frayed, insubstantial,” lost in
space betw een the two poles o f a dualism that the self has created.
Dualism s, Haraway reminds us, are not going to disappear from our worldview any
tim e soon. They form the very structure o f much o f our experience (inside/outside,
true/false, etc.). Even H araw ay’s own arguments depend on dualism — themselves
draw ing distinctions between nature and culture, science and deconstruction. The key,
for Haraway, is to keep an ambivalent relationship to dualisms and to transgress as much
as use them. For her, “One is too few, but two are too many” (ibid.). If we accept this,
we find that troubling our dualisms will not necessarily result in the fragmentation of the
unary or in the unification o f the dual. We are left with dualisms that sometimes make
sense and som etim es do not, that are productive but sometimes painful and always
contestable.
Such an understanding o f dualism inspires Haraway to critique both science and
deconstruction (two practices she has strong commitments to) for their policing o f the
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distinction between truth and illusion. Haraway considers it impossible for science to
discover truth or for deconstruction to show that truth is simply an illusion. Any claim
about the verity o f a single, scientific view or about the equal truth-value of all views
assum es a transcendent viewpoint, a view from nowhere. Haraway insists that we are not
transcendent, that we are trapped in a context, and thus that we cannot make a solid
distinction between truth and illusion, fact and perspective.
Scientific discourses, w ithout ever ceasing to be radically and historically specific, do
still m ake claim s on y o u .... N o scientific account escapes being story-laden, but it is
equally true that stories are not all equal here. Radical relativism ju st w o n ’t do as a w ay
o f finding you r w ay across and through these terrains. (Int 2)

Science can show us that certain accounts o f the world have more empirical relevance
than others, but it can never escape perspective or discourse. What scientists choose to
ask, how they frame their investigation, and how they interpret their results are all
colored by economic, political, and social context. Deconstruction helps us see that
perspective matters and that truth is not simply “discovered,” but it does nothing to
change the fact that some things are simply more real to us than others. Deconstruction
does not vaporize truth claims. It merely shows them to be implicated in networks o f
pow er and meaning and, thus, to be both real and contestable. Radical relativism just
doesn’t make sense to us empirically (or morally) if we accept our embodiedness.
These ideas are not new. Hilary Putnam, for instance, argues that we must “see
relativism andXhe desire for a metaphysical foundation as manifestations o f the same

O ne m ight note that it is an exaggeration to portray m ainstream science as denying that it speaks from a
perspective or deconstruction as being blindly relativistic. Ironically, Haraway feeds into the exaggerations
o f h e r U C SC colleagues, G ary Lease and Michael Souié, w ho have argued that deconstruction rejects the
idea o f a real w orld and has anti-environmental tendencies (1995; xv). Caricatures o f science and
deconstruction, how ever, are com m on to contem porary academ ia and its attached publishing industries,
w h ich seem to thrive on exaggerating schism s and aporias.
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disease”— this disease being the inability to accept that we are embodied, that we have no
less and no more than embodied knowledge, knowledge from a context (177).
“ Som ething in us both craves more than we can possibly have and flees from even the
certainty that we do have,” writes Putnam (178). Like Haraway, Putnam seeks a middle
ground between scientism and deconstruction qua relativism. Haraway advocates a
com m on sense appreciation o f what both science and deconstruction can do for us. Each
tells part o f the story o f how we, as embodied beings, actually relate to dualisms like
truth/illusion. She challenges us to “give up mastery but keep searching for fidelity,
know ing all the while we will be hoodwinked” (SK 199). This modest yet demanding
project sets the stage for the cyborg.

The Cyborg
The cyborg appeared midway through H araw ay’s career, in the mid-1980s, and
achieved notoriety in 1985 with the Socialist Review's publication of “M anifesto for
Cyborgs; Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s.” (The essay has
since appeared elsewhere in revised versions and has inspired a rash o f work by other
scholars.'^) In the 1980s, the conditions o f world systems o f domination underwent
significant changes: M ilitary-industrial complexes became “polymorphous, inform ation
system s” symbolized, for Haraway, by the U.S. m ilitary’s mid-1980s organizational
principle, “ C^I” (command-control-communication-intelligence) (CM 161, 150).

T he “ M anifesto” also appears in Haraway (1991) and Brown University Staff (1989). 1 quote the 1991
version in this paper. Som e works dealing heavily with the “ M anifesto” include Balsamo (1996),
c o m m e n tarie s in Brow n University Staff (1989), and m any o f the essays appearing in Gray, ed. (1995).
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A t issue in the “M anifesto” are two strategic questions, really: W hat direction should
fem inism take? And what direction should leftism in general take? W hen Haraway was
w riting the “M anifesto,” N ew Age culture was growing in popularity, and goddess
w orship, pagan revival, and anti-technological fetishization o f indigenous peoples had
becom e cultural practice for many feminists. W hile this was in part a successful effort to
get beyond the paternalism o f white, second wave feminism, it made some feminists,
including Haraway, nervous. M eanwhile, leftism was still pushing a more or less
industrial-era agenda, fighting hard to keep auto factories operating in the M idwest. In
1985, com puters were common but crude, and the information highway consisted of
slow , obscure BBS technology. That, at such a time, Haraway looked to the cyborg for
strategy is a statement o f her frustration with technophobic feminisms and plodding
leftists.
The cyborg, more properly called the cybernetic organism, takes its name from tire
science o f cybernetics, which explores the idea that computers and organisms are not that
different from each other in that they can both be understood as systems o f inform ation
exchange. In this sense, any organism is a computer: It operates through control systems
that regulate the flow o f genetic, electrical, and chemical information units. Add to this
the realizations that writing and other communications are technologies for control o f
inform ation exchange and that social structures such as religion, law, fashion, and
sexuality are all systems o f information flow, and you start to see that almost everything
can be considered a cybernetic organism. Haraway argues that, in an age o f artificial
intelligence, prosthetic surgery, evolutionary theory, and nanotechnology, the differences
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betw een machine and human, animal and human, and rhaterial and immaterial, for
instance, come into question.
As a result, Haraway tells us, “one should expect control strategies to concentrate on
boundary conditions and interfaces, on rates o f flow across” (163). The power to control
the interfaces betw een categories lies prim arily with the privileged and is guarded
jealously. W hite men capitalize on blurred boundaries by manipulating them for their
ow n ends. During W orld War II, for example, wom en were told that the
m ale :female : :active :passi ve analogy did not hold and that they could and should be active
à la Rosie the Riveter. As soon as the need for w om en’s labor waned (and in fact
presented an econom ic threat to returning soldiers), wom en were told once more that they
w ere passive entities. Similarly, before Native Am ericans were guaranteed the right to
vote in the United States, having even a very low degree o f Native American blood could
be cause for disenfranchisem ent. The government at that time was intent on assimilating
tribal lands, and any aboriginal votes would have represented a threat to that agenda.
Therefore, the boundaries o f the category “Native Am erican” were widened. Nowadays,
how ever, the same boundary is being policed in the opposite way. Prominent institutions
like Stanford University (or many federal programs, for that matter) require official
docum entation proving that Native American applicants are enrolled in state or federally
recognized tribes or have high enough degrees of Native blood to be considered under
University affirm ative action policies. Affirmative action can be viewed as representing
a threat to a white m an ’s admission to a university, and federal programs for enrolled
Indians cost money. This helps explain, in part, why the boundaries o f the category
“N ative A m erican” have been narrowed o f late.
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The cyborg, Haraway believes, is well equipped to understand the w ar over coding
and thus becomes a powerful metaphor for feminism and leftism. Itself occupying the
borderlands between man and machine, natural and artificial, the cyborg notices right
away w hen categories are shifted or erased. In teclmoculture, the world reads like
“problem s in com m unications engineering (for the managers) or theories o f the text (for
those who would resist),” and, Haraway points out, “Both are cyborg sémiologies” (163).
The cyborg acts both as the “fiction mapping our social and bodily reality and as an
im aginative resource” suggesting possibilities for resistance and reformulation of that
reality (150). Cyborgs are the products o f patriarchal, m ilitary-capitalist technology, but
Haraway reassures us that “illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their
origins” (151). Cyborgs can ju st as easily be revolutionary subjects as guardians o f the
status quo. “The political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each
reveals both dom inations and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point”

( 154 ).
Incorporating cyborg consciousness into feminism and leftism does several things.
First, it makes boundaries seem movable rather than natural. If we understand that we
are cyborgs, we can better read the (operating) system and invent paths for hacking that
system and causing stress. Haraway terms this the “struggle against perfect
com m unication” (176), the effort to disrupt ways those in power regulate the way
everyone else receives and transmits information. The cyborg, a potentially sophisticated
and strategic situated knower, feels at home in this kind o f politics. It attempts nothing
m ore than to take "^pleasure in the confusion of boundaries, and... responsibility in their
construction” (150).
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Second, the cyborg is equipped to see itself as a material-sem iotic actor occupying a
landscape that is no less real for being discursive.'® The cyborg knows that existing in a
m aterial and discursive world means having identities and standpoints; it means having
w eight and interest in the system. The cyborg participates in the process o f articulation
w ith this in mind. This is part o f what Haraway means when she continually insists that
w e m ust “cast our lot somew here.” We hack in(to) the system for reasons, impure
reasons, so we can never be innocently revolutionary or “simply oppositional” (M W 3).
The disruption o f the system o f boundaries always means redrawing them, not escaping
from them altogether. Leftists in general and feminists in particular often hold the idea
that their cause is that o f the innocent and violated. For Haraway, this is delusional. As
em bodied actors in a m aterial-sem iotic landscape, we are always implicated and always
interested. H alf organism , half machine, the cyborg’s “natural” state is miscegenation,
“ The cyborg skips the step o f original unity, o f identification with nature in the W estern
sense. This is its illegitimate promise that might lead to subversion o f its teleology as star
wars” (CM 151).
Haraway argues that resistance movements start to work differently when we think in
these terms. N ew possibilities for coalitions open up, for instance, when we substitute
cyborg feminism for essentialist feminisms that concretize gender structures by goddess
w orship or erase racial and other politics by defining “w om an’s experience” in originary
terms.

For one thing, as A nne B a lsa m o ’s Technologies o f the G en dered Body does a good jo b o f rem inding us,
discourse does not operate in a sim ply hyperreal, immaterial realm, but actually works to shape real,
material bodies (1996).
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From the perspective o f cyborgs, freed o f the need to ground politics in ‘o u r ’ privileged
position o f the oppression that incorporates all other dominations, the innocence o f the merely
violated, the ground o f those closer to nature, we can see partial possibilities. (176)

Too often, Haraway fears, specific groups o f resistance miss out on potential alliances
because they are too caught up in their self-image as “merely violated.” The cyborg, she
believes, can embrace a greatly broadened feminist and leftist coalition politics. It can
treat identity as unstable but important and redraw the boundaries o f its own constituency
at strategic intervals— sometimes allowing capitalists to be on its side, sometimes
allowing com puter jocks on board, and so on. The cyborg leftist can work against
racism , sexism, heterocentrism, and im perialism while still leaving quite a lot open for
play. Haraway suggests, then, that a cyborg might prefer the concept o f “affinity groups”
to that o f “identity groups,” The cyborg would encourage multiple and often ironic
connections (jointings, in the sense o f articulation) that are entirely re workable.
In the end, Haraway leaves us, and cyborgian politics, with two linked, unsettling
problems. First, the cyborg is anything but necessarily liberating, and second, some
people are more likely than others to make bad cyborgs (“bad” in the simplified sense of
the battle between the “good” cyborg and the “bad” cyborg in Terminator 2). In answer
to an interview er’s fear that the cyborg could usher in technofascism, Haraway suggests
that such fear is warranted but should not paralyze us. The cyborg just “/s bereft o f
secure guarantees” (Int 7). Haraway prefers working within the dangerous social reality
o f our cyborg existence to giving up completely, or to inventing false guarantees o f
purity, identity, or necessity. Part of working without guarantees, however, means
keeping a watchful eye on one’s own actions. Accordingly, Haraway continually
em phasizes the dangers o f privileged actors doing cyborg resistance work. She doggedly
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figures herself both “as an insider and an outsider to the hegemonic powers and
discourses o f my European and North American legacies” (MW 2) and worries about her
ow n essentialization o f Third W orld wom en (SK 191) and her colonization o f Native
A m erican trickster metaphorics (Int 7). She knows that there is danger not only in
playing with the tropes o f military technology but also in having a privileged voice, a
voice that has a tendency to reinscribe the conditions for its own power. Most im portant
for this paper, and least developed in Haraw ay’s own work, is the danger of men trying to
be leftist cyborgs.
Chela Sandoval, a former student o f Haraw ay’s often cited in Haraway’s own work,
offers a hopeful (but somewhat parenthetical) perspective on male cyborgs. Her essay,
“N ew Sciences: Cyborg Fem inism and the M ethodology of the Oppressed,” makes the
basic argum ent that the oppressed have always practiced cyborg politics. The oppressed
necessarily know how to be hackers and tricksters because they know all too well that
boundaries are not real and that they are continually rewritten by the powerful to maintain
hegem ony. What H araw ay’s “M anifesto” does, Sandoval suggests, is show that the
w isdom o f the oppressed can be used to bridge the apartheid o f all different domains o f
leftism. Cyborgism, with its aptitude for flexible couplings, can link feminist subjects o f
various identity groups and theoretical persuasions and, even, “could very well bring the
politics o f the alienated white male subject into alliance with the subaltern politics o f U.S.
third world fem inism ” (409). This last claim, while intriguing, seems a bit dissonant with
H araw ay’s agenda. W hile it is true that the cyborg metaphor could prove empowering to
disaffected white m en living in the coding structures o f technoculture, one could argue
that, like the oppressed, the privileged have always been cyborgs. Manipulating
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boundaries, redirecting information flow, and shifting identities are already part of the
w hite male m ethodology o f control. After all, in H araw ay’s words, control and resistance
are both cyborg sémiologies. Even if Sandoval means that cyborg politics is good news
for alienated leftist, white males, her statement (not discussed in any detail) merits
substantiation and further qualification.
H araw ay’s own treatment o f the issue o f the male cyborg is tellingly conflicted. She
does write that as technoculture blurs the boundaries around categories such as “natural,”
“corporate executives reading Playboy and anti-porn radical feminists will make strange
bedfellows in jointly unmasking the irrationalism [of naturalized sex roles]” (CM 162).
However, when asked in an interview to consider how a sympathetic man might read the
final line in her “M anifesto” (“I’d rather be a cyborg than a goddess”), Haraway comes
o ff as extremely suspicious o f potential male participation in her project.
T h e r e ’s a w ay in w hich the sensitive m an is the androgynous figure, the figure w ho is even
m o re com plete than the m acho figure. And more dangerous. T h a t’s my resistance to the fact
that 1 do like sensitive folks o f all sexes. But the image o f the sensitive m an calls up, for me,
the male person w ho, while enjoying the position o f unbelievable privilege, also has the
privilege o f gentleness. Then it’s a version o f male fem inism o f which I am very suspicious.
On the other h and , that line is written to and for w om en, and I think I never imagined how a
m an m ight read it.... [M y cyborg] is a polychrom atic g irl... who h a s n ’t really figured out a
politics that m akes the necessary articulations with the boys w ho are your allies. Its undone
w ork. (Int 19, 20)

This quote, w ith its mixed tone o f gravity and ambivalence, exhibits an obvious
reluctance to go where Sandoval does with the “M anifesto.” In the same spirit, while
H araw ay’s troping on cyborg consciousness interests me as a leftist and as an
environm entalist and while Sandoval’s optimism appeals to me, I feel obligated to
engage both cautiously. To explore how environmentalism might fit into the whole

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

31

puzzle, let’s turn now to a consideration of how the cyborg has been used in leftenvironm entalist theory.

C yborg Environm entalism
Haraway maintains a certain distance from environmentalist discourse in her writing.
She is more likely, for instance, to describe an act o f “solidarity” with animals than to
speak o f our duty tow ard living things (PM 319). And though she emphasizes that non
hum an entities are actors in the articulation o f worlds, she stops short of the common
argum ent that if plants and animals are agents, we have moral obligations to them. For
this reason, many people get frustrated with her “for not finally saying what the bottom
line is on these things; they say well do you or don’t you believe that nonhuman actors
are in some sense social agents?” (Int 4). Her answer is intentionally ambiguous; “The
subjects are cyborg, nature is coyote, and the geography is elsewhere” (ibid.).
W hile Haraway shies away from environmentalist discourse, she does imply how
cyborgism might transform environmentalism. As “coyote,” nature evades being cast as
w hole, pure, or transcendent and becomes an active, social construction, continually
being reworked and rearticulated on a shifting terrain. This would make it necessary for
m uch environm entalism to seriously reconsider how blithely it proclaims what nature is
and ought be. Environm entalism can no longer be the political movement with the
apolitical cause. Its tropes express historically specific and irreducibly heterogenous
“hopes, fears, and contradictory histories,” not the will or essence of Earth (SI 3). The
environm entalist in this discourse is entirely bound up in a process o f articulation, living
in the partial yet embodied landscape o f boundary work.
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Cyborg consciousness calls into question the parts o f environmentalism that make
H araw ay uncomfortable. It warns that hegemonic practices can be imported into
definitions o f the “natural.” It also reminds technophobic strains o f environmentalism
that the division between technological and natural is less than clear and that much can be
accom plished by transgressing that division. Finally, the cyborg challenges
environm entalists to see that the health o f the ecosystem is just one o f many important
things to fight for, that racism, classism, etc., will not go away when everyone learns to
recycle, and that hegem onic practices continue to permeate environmentalist discourse.
As a case in point, Haraway discusses a magazine article about how Kayapo Indians are
using video technology to help protest the construction o f a hydroelectric dam on their
land.'^ The article’s author, obviously identifying as environmentalist and proindigenous, portrays the situation as an odd meeting o f the technological and the
traditional (read: “natural”). Haraway insists that, here and elsewhere, these categories
conserve the divide between sophisticated and primitive and smuggle racism and
im perialism in under the guise o f environmentalism.
N oel Sturgeon and Peter van W yck further this work on cyborgian leftenvironmentalism. Sturgeon, again, a former student of Haraway’s, advocates “cyborg
ecofem inism ,” and van Wyck, a Canadian academic, uses the cyborg in what he terms
“weak ecology.” N either author is as well known as Haraway, but each works within the
same disciplinary lineage and helps explore the potential o f H araway’s work.
Sturgeon’s Ecofem inist Natures examines the schismatic and controversial history of
ecofem inism from the perspective o f a practitioner and a critic. She concentrates on three

Z im m e r (1990).
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problem s in ecofeminist theory: the debate about essentializing women, the separation of
theory and practice, and division within the movement.
The debate about essentialism centers around the advantages and disadvantages o f
arguing that women are closer to nature than men (and that women, therefore, are
“natural” environmentalists). Sturgeon agrees with many theorists that essentialist strains
o f ecofem inism simply reverse the valuation o f two poles o f an old, patriarchal dualism
(that wom en are essentially natural and men cultural), but “natural” is now seen as better
than “cultural.” At the same time. Sturgeon warns feminist theorists against making
blanket condem nations o f essentialism. Some essentialisms feed into hegemonic power
structures, she writes, but others (or the same ones at particular moments) can be
liberatory. Sturgeon insists that any critique o f essentialism be based on the particular
im plications o f particular essentialisms, not on the fact o f essentialism alone.
Ecofem inism is not monolithic; it might even, Sturgeon suggests, find a useful tool in
“strategic essentialism ,” the intentional use o f certain essentialist arguments at certain
tim es for feminist ends.
Citing advice given to her to keep ecofem inist activities off her curriculum vitae lest
people think she was not a serious academic. Sturgeon continues by lamenting the
perceived need for fem inist academics to remain aloof from ecofeminism. This sort of
snobbery further separates the ivory tower from popular movements, she argues, and
prom otes a theory/practice divide. It also reflects the stifling, academic tendency to
typologize. The question o f w ho’s “in” and w ho’s “out” with respect to different sorts of
fem inism and environmentalism can be instructive, but Sturgeon feels that theorists spend
far too m uch time generating ways to divide movem ents (for instance, essential!sm/non-
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essentialism ) and not enough finding ways to unite them. Her answer to all these
concerns— to employ strategic essentialism, bridge the theory-practice divide, and
encourage a balance between internal critique and solidarity— is clear from the
beginning.
Interestingly, Sturgeon repackages this agenda in the last few pages of her book under
the nam e “ cyborg ecofem inism ,” because, she asserts, H araway’s cyborg trope lends
itself to strategic essentialism, practical theory, and flexible coalitions. Inhabiting
continually shifting boundaries and not easily set in its ways, the cyborg keeps a critical
eye on the sort o f boundary maintenance that keeps essentialist and antiessentialist (or
any other strains o f feminist environmentalism) apart. The cyborg also sees nature as a
genuine actor in the very real work o f boundary maintenance. The idea that “natural”
entities play a role in the social construction of nature makes them count in the equation
but does not mean that the ecosphere is a “merely violated” guiding spirit. Cyborg
ecofem inism , accordingly, should highlight the shared conditions and potential coalitions
o f w om en and nature but should not necessarily look to nature for a transcendental
validation o f feminism.
Sturgeon acknowledges throughout her book the distance that Haraway maintains
from ecofem inism and its debates, but she suggests that Haraway’s work effectively
represents a new type o f ecofeminism. W hen she “playfully” names it cyborg
ecofem inism . Sturgeon insists that she is not trying to invent a new school o f thought
(and m ore divisions within the movement) but only to suggest possibilities for a more
inclusive and flexible fem inist environmentalism. Cyborg ecofeminism should work in
term s o f articulation o f and flow over boundaries, not in terms of inclusion and exclusion.
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Sturgeon’s renaming is not meant to signify a
...n e w and m ore perfect ecofeminism, but rather to recognize as necessary the dance o f
critique and consolidation that is part o f theorizing and political action; the dialectic o f
creating, deconstructing, and reforming political identities, new alliances, com plex analyses,
and creative oppositional strategies. Every theory aim ed towards political change contains
historically contingent arguments; each solution to political and theoretical problems will be
historically transient. (195)

As Sturgeon surely realizes, this argument, like Haraw ay’s in the “M anifesto,” is relevant
to more than ju st feminism. In most movements, the dance o f consolidation and critique
is not given its fair due. The cyborg has the capacity to remind any political group that a
unified purpose is im portant but that an effective movem ent allows for as much
difference as possible, to keep allies rather than turn them away. However, there is one
point at which consolidation just seems too scary for Sturgeon. Reading the book with
the question o f this paper in mind, it becomes obvious that although she quotes the
ecofem inist work o f some men (Jim Cheney, for instance), Sturgeon, like Haraway, stops
short o f advocating alliances with privileged men.
Where Sturgeon avoids the question o f cyborgism and men, Peter van Wyck barrels
right through it, w ith nary a look askance.'^ Van W yck’s Primitives in the Wilderness
happens to go over the exact terrain I had originally intended to cover in this paper. It
m oves from an exam ination o f conservatism within biocentrist environmental movements
to a suggestion that we use Haraway’s cyborg figure as a role model for a more partial,
m ore leftist, and less fundamentalist environmentalism. Having stumbled across a book
that already attem pts this argument, 1 see a new question; Is biocentrism really the only
urgent problem with environmentalism? 1 think one could argue that privilege, not

As does M ichael Z im m e rm a n in his Contesting E a rth ’s Future p p .355-367. However, Z im m erm an only
engages H araw ay as one o f a num ber o f “ postm od ern ” environm ental philosophers that he finds interesting.
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biocentrist theory, is at the root o f environmentalism-gone-awry. While biocentrism is
especially well equipped to disguise the political as scientific or natural, the practicioner
m ay deserve more interrogation than the practice. Privilege can corrupt any form o f
environm entalism , biocentrist or not, and any form of environmentalism, in the right
hands, can do good work. W hat the cyborg has to say about this is a timely question left
out, I fear, by van Wyck.
Prim itives in the W ilderness begins with a detailed critique o f the paradigmatically
biocentrist environm entalism known as “deep ecology.” Deep ecology falls short, van
W yck argues, because it avoids critiquing modernity from the inside, as a part o f it, and
instead prefers to associate itself with nature, a realm which it locates outside of
m odernity. The result is a critique of modernity that takes on a transcendent air and ends
up seem ing extremely, well, modern. As van W yck writes, “By developing only a
superficial and ultim ately reactionary analysis o f the ‘m odern,’ deep ecology remains
deeply entwined w ithin the very historical forces it attempts to contest” (2).
Ostensibly, deep ecology stands for the abolition o f modern dualisms like the
nature/culture divide, but, like some ecofeminisms, it ends up working only to reverse the
valuation o f the terms. “These acts of boundary jum ping never really challenge the
boundaries, only our position in relation to them. The boundaries remain intact, but a
prohibition is imposed against the side that once held an unnatural sway over the other
(106).” Deep ecology preserves the nature/culture dualism and strays from mainstream
m odern attitudes only in that it treats culture as a resource for nature, rather than the other

He end s up m aking no strong claims about w hether or not his fellow s in the field o f Environmental Ethics
should p ick up on her work.
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way around. Ironically, by taking on the role o f nature’s spokesperson, deep ecologists
seem to position themselves as the sole beneficiaries o f culture-as-resource. Such a
project, in van W yck’s mind, is reactionary, not revolutionary. This maneuver, he points
out, is not one o f im m ersed partiality— the kind that biocentrism claims to exemplify—
but a quintessential “move to the outside.” With its ubiquitous picture o f Earth from
space, deep ecology’s purportedly partial subject looks down on everything to proclaim
that certain acts are natural and good (coyotes eating rabbits) and certain acts are
unnatural and bad (humans eating coyotes). This move to the outside is even more
stunning when we consider that deep ecologists claim to speak on behalf of blue marble
Earth. Transcendence and fundamentalism authorize too many ugly things to be left
unchecked and unquestioned in the hands o f the privileged.
As an example o f the sort o f dangers inherent in deep ecological practice, van Wyck
discusses deep ecology’s well-known reverence for hunter-gatherer societies. These
societies, for the deep ecologist, represent a lost golden age and a model for the future.
T he deep ecological response to the tw entieth-century ecological condition is to wish aw ay the
ha n nful effects o f the “ m o d e m ” by imagining a story wherein modern hum ans have strayed
from their pristine and ecologically benign roots. (2)

Deep ecology’s story about prim itives posits a fundamental opposition between
contem porary hum ans who inhabit the culture side o f the nature/culture dualism and the
fantasized prem odern or posthistorical subject who inhabits the nature side. Both sides o f
the opposition are homogenized, and the gap between them is neatly swept clean. The
m odern hum an is considered sick and the ecological subject is considered one with the
planet. To erase difference in this way is no small sin in the eyes of van Wyck. The m ost
dangerous consequence o f such erasure is that those moderns labeled primitive and those
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m odem s who strive to attain primitive status lose political subjectivity. “No longer a
potential site of resistance, the ecological subject is undifferentiated from its context.
This subject is no subject at all; it becomes a desubjectified organ o f Nature” (106). This
disguises hegemony, and thus makes deep ecology, at least as received in the United
States,'^ into a very convenient and comfortable cause for privileged male
environmentalists. In the deep ecological view, political struggle between groups o f
hum ans along race, class, or gender lines becomes irrelevant. Those who already exist in
harm ony w ith nature have no political problems of their own, and those of us who are not
in harmony with nature need, first and foremost, to worry about the ecosystem. Once we
are back in touch with Nature, a uniform, biotic matrix will subsume our political
differences and problems.
Ultim ately, van W yck turns to Haraway and her cyborg for alternatives to these sorts
o f narratives. His reading o f Haraway focuses on cyborg epistemology, and he identifies
in it a “weak ontology” from which we might derive a “weak ecology.” He sees
pragm atism in H araw ay’s straddling o f deconstruction/ science and other divides and in
her notion o f political, situated knowledge.
We have both radical constructionism on the level o f knowledge claims, a n d a kind o f
scientific realism. There is no particular transcendence involved here; just the
ackn o w led g m e n t that boundaries and m eanings are constructs, and their fabrication speaks
m o re to form s o f hum an agency than it does to ontological certainty; this I would call a form o f
w e a k ontology. (115)

This weakening o f thought avoids fundamentalism on one side and political or moral
paralysis on the other. W eakening our thought actually strengthens our politics, because
it highlights our implication in the process o f meaning-making and calls attention to our

19

Van W yck m akes a point to distinguish the less authoritarian A rne Naess from A m erican deep ecologists
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highly differential and politicized existence. Cyborg politics (like weak ecology) is a
situated practice. “Its transgressive character is retained only in relation to the boundaries
it challenges. It does not dream o f a m etalanguage.. a position of strength, a position
above and beyond” (133). In answer to Sturgeon’s fear about academics and politics,
theory and practice collapse because both occur in the same situated, partial space,
som ewhere between the rarefied zone of philosophy and the more tangible experience of
“real” worlds.
A cyborg’s w eak ontology, van W yck continues, would never generate or even dream
o f generating an ecology o f depth (deep ecology). At the same time, it would not
foreclose on the possibility o f confronting the global environmental crisis. “Rather it
[allows] the problem to be thought in all its terrifying complexity” (112). The
environm ental crisis does not admit o f easy answers, only o f consequences that may hurt
and boundaries that can be disputed. The cyborg gives up on simplistically speaking for
the trees (135), looking for salvation in nature (113), and dismissing cultural politics as
unnatural (106)... all projects that van Wyck finds especially problematic in deep
ecology and, ultim ately unnecessary for a strong political movement.
Although van W yck does not get into it, 1 believe his idea of cyborg
environm entalism avoids the traps o f some other ecological theories of situated
knowledge. There is a body o f bioregional literature, for example, that agrees with
Haraway that we have nonhuman partners in the construction o f social reality but that
goes from there to infer a sort o f moral, environmental im p e r a tiv e .T h e argument reads

like Bill Devait and George Sessions (37).
See, for instance, C heney (1989).
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that when we have situated knowledges, we find that our situation begins to demand
care— and thus, an environmental ethic— from us. The whole notion of moral
im peratives makes me (and Haraway, I think) nervous, but I also take issue with
bioregionalists’ treatm ent o f the “natural” (to the exclusion o f the cultural or political) as
the only im portant aspect o f situatedness. The argument that situated knowledges
dem and an environmental ethic presumes that it is only animals and watersheds that
m ight demand care from us. W hat about refrigerators, political campaigns, and cracked
city sidewalks? A ren’t they part o f our surroundings, too?
The cyborg can have a morality based on situatedness, but there is no limit to what its
situation m ight be, or to what sort o f morality might spring from that situation. The
closest Haraway ever gets to espousing bioregionalism is saying that her cyborgian
epistem ology “m akes room for surprises and ironies at the heart o f knowledge
production,” and that this “is not comfortable for humanists and others committed to the
world as a resource” (SK 199). Cyborgian epistemology does not necessarily defy or
support pillagers o f the ecosphere; Haraway and van Wyck agree that there are no
guarantees here. Cyborg consciousness merely allows for contestation; in van W yck’s
words, “The cyborg is a wager” (115).
A lthough he has quite a bit in common with Haraway, van W yck differs from her in
that he places so m uch o f the blame on biocentrism. The temptation to place the blame
there is great, especially for a critical mind immersed in a heavily biocentrist
environm entalist scene like today’s. We should remember, though, that hegemony
underlies the problem s o f particular worldviews like biocentrism. Bringing privilege to
the foreground o f our critiques of worldviews makes a difference in the conclusions we
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com e to. On the last page o f his book, van Wyck alludes to this; “We might also ask if,
in the end, it is a luxury o f the strong to even imagine a strategy o f weakness. This seems
like an important question, but the answer to this will have to rem ain open” (135). He
leaves it at that, as if dispensing with a concern raised by one o f his editors.
It is an im portant question, though, especially when one realizes that van W yck’s
cyborg environm entalist is unmarked in terms o f race, class, gender, sexuality, etc.—
giving me the uneasy feeling that his cyborg is none other than our old friend, the
unrem arkably white, middle to upper class, heterosexual male. Van Wyck ends his book
exactly where it began: with a question about how to deal with the problem of privilege
in left-environmentalism. In a way, the weak ecologist sounds a lot like Haraway’s
“sensitive m ale,” and we have already seen what Haraway thinks about him. Cyborg
strategy is a wager, for sure, but van Wyck should be more conscious of the sorts o f
inertia that might m ake his cyborg environmentalist just another “chip off the old block”
o f white male hegemony.^'

Beyond Innocence and Guilt?
This paper set out to see if H araw ay’s cyborg trope could help white, middle to upper
class, heterosexual, male left-environmentalists avoid replicating hegemony through their
activism and theory. The short answer, I believe, is not necessarily. Haraway makes it
very clear that her cyborg is not about guarantees. The cyborg is only a metaphor for
what type o f subjects we have always been, what type o f subjects we have become, and

1 take the phrase from W hite G u v s. Fred Pfeil’s study o f chang in g forms o f white straight masculinity in
m usic, film, and m e n ’s m o vem en ts (1995).
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w hat type o f subjects we might become. It is meant to show those who would resist
patriarchy that they already have the tools for hacking into systems o f meaning and that
they need not rely on those narratives o f alienation and salvation (Marxism, Christianity,
psychoanalysis, etc.) that have let them down many tim es before. The cyborg is not a
savior, but it does open political space and opportunity.
Consider the space that has been created for leftism and environmentalism in general.
To begin with, the cyborg can help leftists see that boundaries are movable and
contestable. W ith this understanding, Haraway believes, leftists can more effectively
tinker with the dualisms (male/female, civilized/primitive, etc.) that have traditionally
founded race, gender, class, and sexuality-based hierarchies. Cyborg leftists can also
trouble the boundaries o f kinship typologies used for dividing people and movements
along philosophical or any other lines. The cyborg frees leftists o f the search for a
mythical past and the identity o f being innocent and merely violated and thus allows the
m ovem ent to deal with the complexities o f its situatedness. Finally, cyborg leftism
allows for ironic, shifting coalitions. As embodied, artifactual entities, as tricksters,
cyborg leftists can take very seriously the moral and political agendas closest to their
hearts while keeping open minds about most everything else. M arxists need not eschew
alliance with postm odernists, nor Catholics with pagans, nor N ew Agers with
cyberfem inists, to m ention only a few examples o f real or potential friction (and alliance)
w ithin the left.
Cyborg environm entalism holds similar potential. It occupies the divide between
natural and artificial, suggests that we are all cyborgs, and maintains that the distinction
between biological and technological or cultural systems is fuzzy at best. This radically
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challenges environmentalisms founded on a stable image o f nature. Nature becomes
elusive and negotiable; we can’t find it (or its essence) just by sitting in one place long
enough and observing, and its m eaning is not completely relative and “up for grabs.”
D enied the possibility o f a morally, metaphysically, or politically simple
environmentalism , cyborg environmentalists could be more likely to notice when their
rhetoric or actions work to conserve hegem onic structures or when their politics are being
erased in the name o f a notion o f “ecological integrity” drawn too rigidly, too much
supported for its own sake.
The authors I have discussed leave one hole in their work: the question o f white,
m iddle to upper class, heterosexual, left-environmentalist male cyborgs. This pattern is
understandable. M y character, in a sense, already speaks fluent cyborg. Born a warlord
o f systems o f meaning, trained as border guard for dualisms and kinship-designations,
and indoctrinated as a giver and taker of power, he already occupies the shifting terrain o f
cyborg consciousness. His most sacred task, arguably, is to secure complete power
through exclusive access to cyborg consciousness. Disenfranchised people who might
clearly see the contestability o f borders and hierarchies are continually policed, lest they
step out o f line or do irreparable damage to the operating system. So does this mean that
the inertia o f privilege will necessarily make my character a “bad” cyborg, even if he tries
to be a “good” one? Perhaps, but to quote Haraway slightly out o f context, “that doesn’t
m ean we have to give away the game, cash in our chips and go hom e.” The places where
cyborgism m ight fail us, she argues, are exactly, “the places where we need to keep
contesting” (Int 8).
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Haraway closes her “M anifesto” with a useful image from her background as a
biologist. Reiterating that cyborgs are outside o f the sort o f alienation-salvation
narratives that call for born again souls and societies, Haraway stresses that the cyborg is
m ore comfortable with regeneration than with rebirth. It mutates in a context, never born
o f nowhere or by discrete parents. In this respect, the cyborg reminds Haraway of
salamanders.
For salamanders, regeneration after injury, such as the loss of a limb, involves regrowth of structure
and restoration o f function with the constant possibility o f twinning or other odd topographical
productions at the site o f former injury. The regrown limb can be monstrous, duplicated, potent.
We have all been injured, profoundly. We require regeneration, not rebirth, and the possibilities for
our constitution include the utopian dream o f the hope for a monstrous world without gender. (181)

A lthough stylistically awkward, it is telling that she calls a world without gender a
“possibility” o f a “dream ” o f a “hope.” Her syntax indicates that she sees the possibility
as distant. Gender still matters here and now. My character cannot escape his maleness,
but he can develop odd topographical growths, like “pro-feminism” or “anti-racist
environm entalism .” Haraway puts her hope in the power of monsters (cyborg or
salamander), in the way the system screws up and burps out a potent remainder. What
this m eans for the leftist, environmentalist, white man, I think, is that the cyborg can open
up a space for resistance beyond innocence and guilt.^^
We know that the assumption of innocence is problematic. I remember, for instance,
the account o f a m ale rape survivor whose rapist, between bouts of punching and
penetration, would sometimes stop to comfort his victim, tearfully proclaiming that they
were both horribly w ounded by society. W hat the rapist said was most likely true— the

-- T h a n k s to Annabel Bradford for help with this idea.
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victim was intimately wounded, and the rapist had likely not had an ideal life— but
w oundedness does not justify atrocity.
W hile acknowledging a tyrannical history can be important, the assumption o f guilt
can be problem atic for the privileged leftist. A certain type o f guilty feeling, for example,
can make white guys afraid to identify as feminists or to work on minority issues or in
m inority com m unities. The fear o f their own sexist and racist attitudes (or worse, the fear
o f having them pointed out by the other) can paralyze these potential resistors. Guilt here
acts like the W ilderness Retreat, as a segregatory mechanism that postpones radical
change. This aspect o f guilt is counter-productive. While white guys should not forget
that the deck is stacked in their favor, they do not need to accept the deck at face value; as
its illegitim ate cyborg children, they can reject the system o f domination and subvert its
prejudiced allocation o f extra “points.”
Furthermore, white guilt, heterosexual guilt, male guilt, class guilt, and W estern guilt
can actually all preserve elements o f hegemony. This family of guilt assumes (and
enforces through daily interactions) that the other has been reduced to something
irreparably and shamefully wounded and that the self alone carries the difficult
responsibility o f m agnanimously welcoming the other in(to the unmarked white society
o f the self). G uiltily avoiding the eye o f an African American on the street, for example,
carries w ith it the assum ption that the African American has been made socially and
culturally inferior (by the system) and communicates that s/he is an untouchable outsider
unable to regenerate autonomously.
The cyborg bears good news here. W hite, m iddle to upper class, heterosexual, male
left-environm entalists can move beyond the airy spaces o f innocence and guilt to inhabit
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the lively, real, m aterial-sem iotic spaces o f boundary work and embodied discursiveness.
A s cyborgs allied with the disempowered, they can do an “inside-job” on a system that
continually violates and subjugates people, plants, and animals alike. Embracing
cyborgism may also help left-enviromuentalist men take their identity less seriously,
avoid feeling purely evil or hegemonic, and resist the often insecure need to take extra
points for being sensitive, environmentalist, or leftist. W hite guys can and should
participate, albeit cautiously, in the very conversations that indict them. This is a hard
lesson to learn, and w hen it is easy, we should ask why. This means surrendering the
com fort o f acting as a talking head for environmentalism and leftism; it means taking an
im plicated stance som ew here down with the “rabble”; and it means always running the
risk o f disconnecting the wrong wires. The cyborg will not necessarily solve all our
problem s, but good things don’t often come with guarantees.
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